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Using an innovative variation of the standard Matching Market
Design framework, this draft aims to provide inputs useful to drive
the reform of the current Italian Domestic Adoption System (Italian
families that desire to adopt an Italian child).
The problem addressed in this draft, concern how to match the rel-
ative small number of waiting children to the large number of waiting
families in the most rational and efficient way: each year, the adop-
tions system is not able to place the 20% of the children in foster care,
despite the fact that the number of children (supply side) is very small
respect the total amount of families (demand side) willing to adopt.
This project is oriented to solve the inefficiencies characterizing
the current adoption program, substituting the actual decentralized
setup with a more efficient centralized matching market criteria.
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Using an innovative variation of the standard Matching Market Design frame-
work, this draft aims to provide inputs useful to drive the reform of the cur-
rent Italian Domestic Adoption System (Italian families that desire to adopt
an Italian child).
The problem addressed in this draft, concern how to match the relative
small number of waiting children to the large number of waiting families in
the most rational and efficient way: each year, the adoptions system is not
able to place the 20% of the children in foster care, despite the fact that the
number of children (supply side) is very small respect the total amount of
families (demand side) willing to adopt.
This project is oriented to solve the inefficiencies characterizing the cur-
rent adoption program, substituting the actual decentralized setup with a
more efficient centralized matching market criteria.
Two are the main concepts on which this reform draft is based:
(i) shifting from a costly, incoherent and inefficient decentralized system
based on regional scale, to a more rational centralized system based on na-
tional scale;
(ii) introducing a mathematical perspective finalized to automate part of
the adoptive placement process, through the implementation of a matching
algorithm able to provide to the social planner a fast and effective indication
regarding the compatibility degree between every single child waiting for an
adoption and the candidate families willing to adopt.
All considerations developed in this draft are based on a data analysis fo-
cused on the most recent bi-annual adoptions cycle 2005-2006, but the same
considerations can be extended without any loss in terms of generality, for
all the previous adoption cycles.
The second section of the draft provides a general overview concerning
the current decentralized adoptions system. The third paragraph contains a
simple analysis finalized to stress the high degree of inefficiency that charac-
terize this kind of decentralized setting. Fourth section develops the intuition
concerning the new theoretical matching framework – based on centralization
and matching algorithm – useful to drive a fruitful reform.
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2 Introduction: Decentralized Adoptions System
From the legal point of view, the Italian adoptions system is regulated by
Law n. 184/19831 and Law n. 149/20012. It is formally and operatively
divided in two different branches.
The International Adoptions System3, managed jointly by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice through the Government Commis-
sion for International Adoption, deals with Italian families willing to adopt
foreign children.
The Domestic Adoption System4, (un)coordinated by the Ministry of
Justice and based on the system of the Regionals Courts of Minors, deals
with Italian families willing to adopt Italian children.
This reform draft is focused only on the latter system.
The following are the typical steps that lead to a matching adoption
placement in the current institutional setting:
(i) Children in foster care
Children which are found in situation of neglect, due to the original
families are not able to provide an adequate level of care, are declared
in a state of adoptability by the Regional Court of Minors having the
competence for those children residing in the district. Established that
children are in a state of abandonment, starts the adoption procedure
which aims to identify the parental couple who can best fit the needs
of each child. During the lead time, children are placed in temporary
foster care. The Italian Courts of Minors regional network is made up
of 29 courts having regional competence (there are 20 courts, one for
each region, plus 9 sub-courts).
(ii) Family applications for adoptions
Families willing to adopt a child (having all the prescribed prerequi-
sites) can apply to all the different courts of minors in which they are
interested in, to start the preliminary adoption process. Every single
family has the possibility to submit more applications to different
1Law n. 184/1983, URL: http://www.giustizia.it/cassazione/leggi/l184 83.html
2Law n. 149/2001, URL: http://www.giustizia.it/cassazione/leggi/l149 01.html.
Deeply described in Fadiga (2003), Ichino Pellizzi, Zevola (2002).
3Documentation available, URL: http://www.commissioneadozioni.it/Contents/?idPagina=30
4Documentation available, URL: http://www.giustizia.it/minori/adozioni/adozione naz.htm
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courts for minors. In line of principle each family has the opportunity
to submit 29 applications, one for each court. Due to there are no sum-
mary statistics available on this type of data5, we take as reference the
anecdotical evidence6: the representative family submits 2 applications
in two different courts.
(iii) Court’s evaluations and placement process
Each court of minors is in charge to screen independently all the appli-
cations that it receives. Applications belonging to the subset that are
positively evaluated (applications of course can be rejected due to the
family’s characteristics are not conform to the requested standards),
are classifies respect some specific criteria, having in mind the objec-
tive function to assign each child to the most appropriate family. In
this context, law gives considerable freedom to each court, in terms of
procedures criteria and internal organization.
(iv) Pre-adoption trial period
The competent court of minors, on the basis of the investigations and
assessments carried out, chooses among families who applied and have
been accepted, the most suitable couple with reference to the specific
needs of the child. During the entire one year pre-adoption trial period,
the court will not only perform control but also support.
(v) Definitive adoption
Completed with success the pre-adoption period (one year), the court
assigns definitely the child to the family. This process has a one-year lag
respect the adoption application: for this reason to study correctly the
dynamics of the adoption process, we must take in account a bi-annual
cycle (t0 =application, t1 =adoption).
5Actually data on this aspect exist, but they are not summarized by any central sta-
tistical office.
6The source of this information is Associazione Nazionale Famiglie Adottive e
Affidatarie, contact: segreteria@anfaa.it ; there is also an ISTAT (2006) estimation
of 1.9 (for year 2003), contact: urbano@istat.it .
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3 Evaluations: Inefficiencies in Decentralized Adoptions
The previous brief description on the current adoptions system is sufficient
to stress the nature of some major inefficiencies and problems that this kind
of decentralized institutional setting entails:
(i) Families have to bear duplication costs on applications procedures,
due to the system imposes to produce a new specific application for each
different court. In this case, costs are not principally monetary costs, but
transaction costs linked to bureaucracy requirements and for instance multi-
ple and repeated interviews to sustain in different regions.
(ii) Ministry has to bear huge duplication costs concerning applications
assessments and families classification. This kind of duties have a strong im-
pact on the Ministry’s budget as they are extremely labor and time intensive.
In addition to inefficiencies of this nature regarding operative aspects,
there are some other more important and substantial negative effects:
(iii) In this system there is room for the paradoxically possibility that an
application, positively evaluated by courts A, B and C, in line of principle,
can be rejected by court D (or viceversa): this phenomenon brings strong
negative implication in terms of making safe for families to participate in the
market.
(iv) Because each adoptable child is locked in an exclusive regional court,
it is clearly possible that in the set of families having applied to that spe-
cific court, there is no appropriate one able to fit the needs of a given child,
on the other hand a family having all the right features and requirements
may be available in the bordering region’s court. From the point of view
of the demand side (families), this institutional setting leads to a sort of
congestion issue. On the other side of the market, a relative (un)thickness
problem arises in the supply side (children) due to the proportional scarcity
of children respect the total amount of families applications, in addition to
a skewed distribution across the differnt regions in the country.
This kind of inefficiencies and transaction costs determine a strong impact
on the capacity of the system to provide an effective matching service, mea-
sured as capacity to provide adequate number of matches: analysing data7
focused on the bi-annual adoptions cycle 2005-2006, is possible to observe
that this kind of decentralized programme achieves an inefficient and unsat-
isfactory matching rate of 78%: giving 6,755 family available for adoptions
(corresponding to 13,510 multiple applications), on 1,153 children seeking for
7Data available on demand, Minististero della Giustizia - Dipartimento di Giustizia
Minorile (Sez. Statistica), contact: statistiche.dgm@giustizia.it. Data available
from 1993 to 2006.
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a family, only 907 have been placed: 246 children (corresponding to the 22%
of the total) have not been allocated.
This means that the system achieves only the 78% of the maximal theo-
retical efficiency level (excluding to account also for all the additional ineffi-
ciencies in term of children’s welfare loss, budget expenditure, waste of time







4 Reform Proposal: A New Centralized System
Due to the high degree of decentralization and parcelization of the system,
there is no systematic way to sift through ’child positions’ made available
by different regional courts. Children are locked in their specific local court
and families are bounded in the courts where they have submit the adoption
application. This scenario creates a clear bottleneck in adoptive placement.
To design a more efficient adoptions matching program8 first of all is
necessary to centralized9 the whole process at national level, exploiting all
the advantages that a central database/clearinghouse can bring.
After the polling centralization of both sides of the market, this reform
project proposes to automate the sequence regarding the comparison between
the needs of waiting children and the characteristics of the families. Also in
this particular kind of approach, the objective function of the social plan-
ner is the maximization of the child’s welfare. According to Ward (1997),
families’ preferences over children are based on their peculiar characteristics
in terms of strenghtness; the children’s preferences over families are based
on their own specific needs. Due to complementarity between child’s needs
and family’s strenghtness, this approach argues that - in some extent - are
8The economic literature on matching market design applied to adoptions systems -to
my knowledge- is very limited: Balding (2009), Blackstone and Hakim (2003), Blackstone,
Buck and Hakim (2004), Blackstone, Buck, Hakim and Spiegel (2008), Hansen and Hansen
(2006), Hansen (2007), Landes and Posner (1978).
9Note that the current common consensus on adoptions systems - in line with all
others welfare services, such as health - is oriented to a privatization process through
the institution of private and decentralized agencies (Hansen 2007). For instance, this is
precisely the case in US, UK and Canada.
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the child’s needs to drive the entire allocation process: each child will choose
(through the social worker intermediation) the candidate family having the
right characteristics to satisfy her specific needs.
The pooling philosophy can therefore increase the probability that one or
more appropriate families, given the specific needs of each child, will be found
in the national pool: using this kind of approach, the social planner has the
opportunity to increase the number of adoptions from foster care, accelerating
the adoptive process and reducing costs of placement. In addition, this draft
proposes the new idea to automate (only) a specific sequence of the placement
system, in particular the section concerning the classification mechanism.
This fundamental step, representing the main pillar on which is based the
final matching process, can be fruitfully automated using an extension of a
two-sided matching algorithm.
This innovative application to adoptions field, has got as reference frame-
work a peculiar variation of the standard two-sided matching model currently
applied to match medical residents with residency positions - NRMP (Roth
and Peranson 1999).
In this new framework, all the prospective families interested in adoptions,
will apply to just an unique central agency, where the planner (the social
staff) will perform all the necessary activities finalized to elicit – though
screening and assessments – all the relevant characteristics of each family
(representing its preferences) that in a second step will be recorded into a
central database on national scale. On the other hand, children in foster care
seeking for a placement in a family, will be registered in the same centralize
database where the planner (the social staff) is in charge to declare the main
needs of each child (representing her preferences over candidate families’
characteristics/strenghtness).
Having at its disposal this kind of information set, the planner can now
image to design an ad-hoc matching algorithm, constructed in such a way to
reproduce the social worker decison-making.
The aim of the algorithm is to provide not just one exclusive an uni-
vocal matching solution, but a more complete menu of 10 families having
the highest compatibility degree in terms of characteristics with reference to
each specific child belonging the national pool. Please note, that the scope
of the algorithm is not the one to substitute tout-court the social worker
experience and her specific human touch during the matching process, more
simply it aims to provide a helpful pre-indication based on this innovative
typology of compatibility measure, that will lead to faster and more efficient
classification and matching process: having at her disposal a pool of 10 po-
tential adequate candidate families selected by the algorithm, social workers
will be in the best condition to individuate the more appropriate family for
7
each child (choosing among the pre-selected panel of families) using the tra-




To provide a general idea concerning the specific type of algorithm that
this project can implement, it is useful to recall the notions of Complex
Matching Algorithms, having the peculiar feature to be able to deal with
matching variation issues (Roth 1996). In particular, this sophisticated class
of matching algorithms provides efficient and stable matches in the most
complex scenario where the preferences’ structure is characterized by com-
plementarities, lexicographic orderings and linkages between agents involved
in the matching mechanism. The typical example in the existing literature,
is represented in National Resident Matching Program by couples of doc-
tors (husband and wife) showing complementarities concerning preferences
focused over the same slot of hospitals (Kagel and Roth 2000). In the adop-
tion environment on which this draft is focused in, a situation of this nature
arise dealing with couples of siblings having preferences oriented to obtain
a placement in the same adoptive family. An adoption matching process,
based on this class of matching algorithms, provides the fruitfully possibility
to achieve a more efficient and fast definition regarding the subset of candi-
date families, that can be considered suitable with reference to the specific
needs of each single child. It is evident that the process will be time saving,
as the social worker have to deal just with a restricted and selected subset of
candidate compatible families, not with the entire panel of applicant families.
In this kind of framework, most of the resources will invested in collecting
all the relevant information on children and candidate families. In line of
principle, the institution of the central database - core of the centralized
adoptions model and indispensable infrastructure to the matching algorithm
- represents an extremely feasible operation.
Exploiting the (latent) Law n. 91/200410 titled Banca Dati dei Minori
Adottabili, there is the clear opportunity to integrate all the anagraphical
information regarding children in adoptability status (that are currently col-
lected just for mere administrative purposes), with all the salient and relevant
information regarding the payers involved in the both side of the market:
10Law n. 91/2004, URL: http://www.giustizia.it/cassazione/leggi/d91 04.html
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families’ characteristics and children’s needs11. These kind of data are indis-
pensable to run the algorithm.
From the theoretical point of view, complex two-sided matching algo-
rithms are very well suited for application in a matching adoption program
environment.
However, because of the sensitive nature of the subject with this reform
draft is dealing, it is very relevant to construct and provide evidence that
automation based upon this type of model will produce matches satisfactory
to social workers and conforming to their decision-making criteria. At the
same time, it is essential to compile evidence of the potential benefit to wait-
ing children and families, measured in reduced time to adoptive placement,
as well as evidence of long run cost savings to Ministry of Justice.
As a first step toward practical application, this draft proposes an as-
sessment based on simulation approach oriented to develop computational
experiments (Kagel and Roth 2000).
(i) In order to guarantee the characteristics used in the matching algo-
rithm are in line with the characteristics actually considered, researchers will
ask to the adoption specialists explain their decision-making rationality they
apply and follow to design matching decisions. Having available this kind of
information, it is possible to stylized a formal model concerning the decision-
making approach in adoptions environment and all the variables to take in
account to provide reliable and efficient match outcomes.
(ii) Researchers now can create a factious data set on children and fam-
ilies, based on a set of known variables and key characteristics (children’s
needs and families’ features) necessary to meet the requirements and useful
to evaluate the compatibility between algorithm’s matching output and real
social worker matching.
Following this kind of Scientific Experimental Protocol to test the reform’s
effects and its own dynamics, researchers can respond to critics who may be
skeptical of depersonalization in the adoption process.
Further, all results coming from the computation experimental session,
can be used as a basis for interesting comparisons, both with the actual
matches made (in other words, can be tested whether perceptions regarding
11According to Smith and Howard (1991), the sociological literature tells us how all the
most successful adoption matching are characterized by the strictly coincidence of natural
parents’ features and adoptive parents’ features (with particular reference to age aspects).
As the 65% of the total children in adoptability status are classified as ’known parents’,
could be fruitful integrate the database also with data regarding the natural parents.
9
important criteria in matching activities are consistent with field observa-
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6 Figures & Table
Figure 1: Decentralized Adoptions System
13
Figure 2: Centralized Matching System
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Table 1: Data Analysis bi-annual Adoptions Cycle 2005/2006
Regional Cu Ck Ct Fd Fn C:F AA Ar EE
Court
Ancona 8 22 30 506 253 8.43 12 18 40%
Bari 8 61 69 572 286 4.14 22 47 32%
Bologna 31 34 65 867 433.5 6.66 65 0 100%
Bolzano 3 5 8 200 100 12.5 6 2 75%
Brescia 30 14 44 622 311 7.07 42 2 95%
Cagliari 1 47 48 319 159.5 3.32 27 21 56%
Caltaniss. 0 10 10 241 120.5 12.05 4 6 40%
Campobasso 2 1 3 228 114 38 3 0 100%
Catania 4 33 37 499 249.5 6.74 36 1 97%
Catanzaro 12 19 31 356 178 5.74 8 23 26%
Firenze 25 21 46 776 388 8.44 40 6 87%
Genova 6 14 20 471 235.5 11.78 20 0 100%
L’Aquila 5 11 16 385 192.5 12.03 15 1 94%
Lecce 3 2 5 334 167 33.4 5 0 100%
Messina 3 6 9 195 97.5 10.83 5 4 56%
Milano 62 67 129 1483 741.5 5.75 129 0 100%
Napoli 25 40 65 721 360.5 5.55 65 0 100%
Palermo 5 70 75 639 319.5 4.26 59 16 79%
Perugia 7 4 11 360 180 16.36 11 0 100%
Potenza 2 6 8 356 178 22.25 4 4 50%
Reggio Cal. 4 1 5 277 138.5 27.7 5 0 100%
Roma 70 54 124 368 184 1.48 103 21 83%
Salerno 12 5 17 287 143.5 8.44 17 0 100%
Sassari 2 6 8 154 77 9.63 3 5 38%
Taranto 0 12 12 362 181 15.08 6 6 50%
Torino 43 85 128 900 450 3.52 124 4 97%
Trento 3 15 18 259 129.5 7.19 5 13 28%
Venezia 46 66 112 773 386.5 3.45 66 46 58%
TOTAL 422 731 1,153 13,510 6,755 5.86 907 246 78%
(*) Trieste Court of Minors: missing values.
(i) Data provider, Ministero della Giustizia - Dip. Giustiza Minorile (Sez. Statistica)
(ii) Data elaboration, it is my own responsibility.
Cu: Children having unknown natural parents (year 2005)
Ck: Children having known natural parents (year 2005)
Ct: Children Total [Cu+Ck] (year 2005)
Fd: Total Families Demands (year 2005)
Fn: Total Families willing to adopt (year 2005), [Ct/Fd/2], sources ANFAA and ISTAT.
C:F: Child/Families ratio, families available for each child (year 2005)
i.e. 5.86 = 1 child: 5.86 families.
AA: Effective Adoptions (year 2006 - one year lagged than the pre-adoption trial period in 2005)
Ar: Childre not placed.
EE: Efficiency Rate [AA/Ct %]. 15
